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The internationalization of the yen is a widely discussed topic, among not only 
economists but also journalists and even politicians. Although various ideas 
are discussed under this heading, three are the focus of attention: First, and the 
most narrow, is the use of  yen by  nonresidents. Second is the possibility of 
Asian economies forming an economic bloc with Japan and the yen  at the 
center. Third, is the possibility that the yen could serve as a nominal anchor for 
Asian countries, resembling the role played by the deutsche mark in the Euro- 
pean Monetary System (EMS). 
Sections 13.1-13.3  of  this paper try to give a broad overview of  the key 
facts concerning the three topics, above. The remaining sections discuss the 
international role the yen could play, particularly in Asia. 
13.1  The Yen  as an Invoicing Currency 
Following the transition to a floating exchange rate regime, the percentage 
of Japan’s exports denominated in yen rose sharply in the early 1970s and con- 
tinued to rise to reach nearly 40 percent in the mid- 1980s, a level since main- 
tained (table 13.1). There is a marked difference according to export destina- 
tion-while  yen is rarely used vis-A-vis exports to the United States, nearly 
half of all exports to Asian countries are invoiced in yen. 
The yen  is even less used for invoicing imports into Japan. However, the 
Hiroo Taguchi is chief manager of  Research Division I of the Institute for Monetary and Eco- 
nomic Studies of  the Bank of Japan. 
The author benefited greatly from discussions with, and suggestions from, KuNo  Okina and 
Kazuo Momma, as well as the valuable comments of  the participants in the Third Annual East 
Asia Seminar on Economics, in particular Anne Krueger and Kazuo Ueda. He also thanks Yuko 
Nishijima, Michiko Matsumoto, and Atsushi Inoue for their help in preparing the tables. Views 
expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Japan. 
335 336  Hiroo Taguchi 
Table 13.1  Use of Yen  as Invoicing Currency in Japan’s Trade (% of value) 
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- 
Sources: Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), Sfatistics on Export Confirmation 
(Yushutu  Kakuninn  Toukei)  and Sfatistics  on Import Report (Yunyuu  Houkaku Toukei)  (Tokyo, vari- 
ous issues). 
”Based on number of export confirmations. 
bAs of FY 1985. 
percentage of  yen-denominated  imports has  been  rising  steadily since the 
1980s, especially from Asian countries. In trade among third countries (“ve- 
hicle currency”), the use of  the yen is almost negligible. 
The limited utilization of  domestic currency in invoicing Japan’s trade is in 
sharp contrast with the situation in other major industrial countries (table 13.2). 
There are a number of reasons for this.’ First, and perhaps most important, 
there is a significant historical (or “hysteresis”) element involved in selecting 
a transaction currency, which works naturally for “old” international currencies 
like the U.S. dollar and the pound sterling. However, there are also several 
other reasons. 
If the level of expected profit from trade is given, both exporters and import- 
ers will seek the smallest possible fluctuation in trading profits, assuming they 
are risk-averse. However, they should be willing to accept greater profit fluc- 
tuation if the expected profit is also higher. Therefore, the choice of  which 
currency to use should depend primarily on whether the cost of  hedging ex- 
change rate risk is lower for the exporter or the importer. 
One way to manage exchange rate risk is to pass through exchange rate fluc- 
tuations to input and output prices. With regard to input prices, the larger the 
share of  imports in total production costs and the more dependent the home 
country is on trade, the easier it is to mitigate the impact of  exchange rate 
movements through changes in input costs like wages and material prices. With 
regard to output prices, it should be easier to pass through increases to the 
consumer if there are few or no domestic substitutes in the importing country. 
1. For discussions on the invoicing currency role of the Japanese yen, see also Taguchi (1982). 
Tavlas and Ozeki (1991). Kawai (1992), and Takeda and Turner (1992). 337  On the Internationalization of the Japanese Yen 
To a considerable extent these factors explain the relatively high utilization of 
domestic currency for invoicing the exports of major developed countries, and 
vice versa with respect to imports, since they tend to export industrial goods 
with a high degree of differentiation and import primary products for which 
there are few domestic substitutes. The small use of the yen for Japanese im- 
ports seems to be consistent with the very high proportion of food, fuel, and 
raw materials in Japan's total import composition, e.g., 53 percent in 1988, as 
compared to 25 percent in the case of Germany. 
Another factor that also seems to help explain the tendency to invoice Japan's 
trade in foreign currencies is the existence of large trading companies in Japan. 
These companies, which handle the bulk of both Japan's exports and imports, 
have a relative advantage in managing foreign exchange risk compared with 
their trading counterparts. They enjoy economies of  scale in terms of risk man- 
agement; moreover, they are able to offset a considerable portion of their risk 
exposure stemming from their export business with that from imports. 
Another possible factor is the strong preference of Japanese manufacturers, 
relative to their trading partners, for stable production levels, which perhaps 
reflects Japan's  life-long employment system. Thus, to minimize fluctuations 
in foreign demand occasioned by exchange rate movements, they tend to have 
their exports denominated in the currency of the importer. 
The explanations provided above seem to be broadly consistent with several 
important observations: (i) the proportion of exports invoiced in yen has risen 
as Japanese export goods have become more differentiated; (ii) invoicing in 
yen is not common for exports to the United States (which is the single largest 
export market for Japan and where importers are less experienced in managing 
foreign exchange risk), while it is relatively common for exports to Southeast 
Asia (which is a more marginal market than the United States and where trad- 
ers are more familiar with handling exchange rate risk); and (iii) the increase 
in yen-invoiced imports from Southeast Asia reflects the growth in imports 
from Japanese implants (whose cost structure has a high yen component). 
Table 13.2  Share of 'Ikade Denominated in Domestic Currency of Selected 
Industrial Countries (% of  value) 
Exports  Imports 
Country  1980  1988  1980  1988 
United States  97.0  96.0  85.0  85.0 
Germany  82.3  81.5'  43.0  52.6 
France  62.5  58.5  33.1  48.9 
United Kingdom  76.0  57.0  38.0  40.0 
Italy  36.0  38.0'  18.0  27.0" 
Japan  29.4  34.3  2.4  14.1 
Source: Tavlas and Ozeki (1991). 
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13.2  Use of Yen in International Finance 
13.2.1  Capital Market 
Until the mid-l980s, the bulk of international bonds (Euro-bonds plus for- 
eign currency bonds) was denominated in US.  dollars, followed by deutsche 
marks and Swiss francs. In fact, around 80 percent of newly placed interna- 
tional bonds were denominated in these three currencies (table 13.3). Follow- 
ing a series of  liberalization measures, the share of yen-denominated bonds 
started to rise in the second half of the 1980s and now accounts for about 13 
percent of  total new issues. However, it should be noted that this recent in- 
crease reflects, in addition to basic factors such as lower issue fees and fewer 
regulatory encumbrances in the overseas markets, partly a temporary situation 
whereby many  Japanese companies had difficulty raising funds in the stock 
market due to the drastic fall in  stock prices and thus tried to raise funds 
abroad. A great share of those bonds were apparently purchased by affiliates 
of  Japanese companies and thus in that sense could be considered de facto 
domestic issue. 
13.2.2  International Bank Loans 
The proportion of  yen-denominated loans was negligible in the 1970s, but 
rose sharply in the 1980s when Japanese banks tried to establish themselves 
overseas (table 13.4). However, it has leveled off recently, reflecting mainly 
the increasingly cautious behavior of Japanese banks abroad, influenced by the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) capital adequacy ratio and problems 
involving sovereign loans to some developing countries. 
Although yen loans still play only a modest role globally, they are becoming 
common in Asian countries. Table 13.5 gives a currency breakdown of the total 
foreign debt of selected Asian countries (Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Indone- 
sia, and the Philippines). The proportion of yen-denominated debt in the total 
borrowing of these countries doubled from 19.5 percent at the end of 1980 to 
Table 13.3  Currency Composition of International Bonds (% of new issues) 























































Source: OECD, Financial Market Trends (Paris, various issues). 339  On the Internationalization of the Japanese Yen 
Table 13.4  Currency Composition of International Bank Lending (% of amount 
outstanding) 
1980  1985  1990  1991‘ 













































Source: BIS, “International Banking and Financial Market Developments” (Basle, various issues). 
“First nine months of  1991. 
Table 13.5  Currency Composition of External Debt in Southeast Asian 
Countries (%) 
1980  1985  1990 
Yen  Dollar  Yen  Dollar  Yen  Dollar 
Korea  16.6  53.5  16.7  60.3  29.5  32.4 
Thailand  25.5  39.7  36.1  25.5  43.5  20.8 
Malaysia  19.0  38.0  26.4  50.6  37.1  35.6 
Indonesia  20.0  43.5  31.7  30.7  39.3  18.5 
Total of above  19.5  47.3  25.8  44.7  37.9  27.0 
(billion $ U.S.)  (45.2)  (93.5)  (115.6) 
Philippines  22.0  51.6  24.9  47.8  40.5  34.7 
Source: Tavlas and Ozeki (1991). 
37.9 percent at the end of  1990. This rapid increase owes partly to currency 
revaluation occasioned by the appreciation of the yen in the second half of the 
1980s, as well as to an increase in official yen loans which reflects efforts to 
increase official development aid (ODA). 
13.2.3  Yen  as a Reserve Currency 
To  obtain a broad idea of the use of  the yen as a reserve currency in the 
private sector, it should be noted that the proportion of  yen  in total Euro- 
deposits is growing steadily, but was still only 5.0 percent at the end of  1990, 
compared with  55.2 percent for the U.S. dollar and  13.8 percent for the 
deutsche mark (table 13.6). The yen’s  share is about the same as that of  the 
Swiss franc. However, Japan’s GDP is 13 times larger than Switzerland’s, so 
it is fair to say that the yen is playing only a very modest role in the Euro- 
deposit market. 340  Him  Taguchi 
Table 13.6  Currency Composition of Euro-currency Market (deposits 
outstanding: %) 










































Source: BIS, “International Banking and Financial Market Developments (Basle, various issues). 
Note: Foreign currency4enominated debt outstanding by BIS reporting banks. 
“First nine months of  199  1. 
As an official reserve asset, the presence of yen  is somewhat greater. The 
share of yen  assets in total official reserves of  IMF member countries grew 
gradually in the 1980s, and reached 9.1 percent at the end of 1990 (table 13.7). 
In particular, in the portfolios of  the official monetary institutions of  Asian 
countries the proportion held in yen is relatively high-17.5  percent at the end 
of 1990. The fact that the yen is relatively important as an official reserve asset 
in Asia seems to reflect the growing interdependence between Japan and the 
Asian countries and the increased (official) yen debts of the latter. The figure 
was even higher in the second half of  the 1980s. However, after having re- 
corded a high of 30.0 percent at the end of  1987 and thus coming quite close 
to the figure for the U.S. dollar (41.2 percent), the share has since declined. 
The rise in the yen’s  share in the mid-1980s seems to reflect the yen’s appreci- 
ation, greater desire on the part of Asian authorities to hedge against exchange 
rate risk in light of increased official borrowing in yen, and undoubtedly some 
speculative elements seeking capital gains from the further appreciation of 
the yen. 
The background to the subsequent decline is not that obvious. However, it 
is likely that Asian authorities sought higher interest income by moving out of 
yen as exchange rate fluctuations moderated at around 120-140 yeddollar. The 
fact that the yen’s  weight in the official reserve portfolios of Asian countries 
displayed large swings in a relatively short period suggests that the yen  still 
remains a kind of  secondary reserve asset for them in the sense that profitabil- 
ity, in addition to liquidity, is a significant motive for holding the currency. 
13.2.4  Foreign Exchange Market 
Looking at the volume of yen transactions on foreign exchange markets, in 
1980 in the New  York  market, for example, U.S. dolladyen transactions ac- 
counted for only 10.2 percent of total transactions; however, by  1989 this fig- 341  On  the Internationalization of the Japanese Yen 
ure had grown to 25.2 percent, closer to the 32.9 percent for U.S. dollar/ 
deutsche mark transactions (table  13.8). In the world’s  major markets as a 
whole (table 13.9), transactions involving yen account for 27 percent of  total 
transactions and, together with the deutsche mark, the yen is the second most 
traded currency after the U.S. dollar. In table 13.9,  both currencies involved in 
a transaction are counted and therefore the total adds up to 200 percent, not 
100 percent. Note also that the share of the deutsche mark is somewhat under- 
estimated since transactions in German foreign exchange markets are not in- 
cluded. 
It is worthwhile to mention that the yen is the second most traded currency 
in the Hong Kong and Singapore markets, which have considerable trading 
volumes even if smaller than those of the three biggest markets, namely, New 
York, London, and Tokyo. In contrast, the volume of yen-related transactions 
is still small in the Australian foreign exchange market. 
There is no reliable data on international use of  the yen in its most direct 
sense, that is use of yen notes abroad. Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests 
that although the use of yen notes abroad by Japanese tourists is growing, they 
are only rarely used for transactions among non-Japanese. The return of yen 
notes to Japan from abroad amounts to about Y1 trillion per year. Assuming 
that the notes remain abroad for an average of three months (piecemeal infor- 
mation suggests that the actual stay is shorter), the outstanding amount of yen 
Table 13.7  Currency Composition of Identified Official Foreign Exchange 
Holdings of IMF Member Countries (%; year-end data) 
Countries  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990 
All 
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Source: IMF, Annual Report (Washington, D.C.,  various issues). 342  Hiroo Taguchi 
Table 13.8  Currency Composition of Transactions  on the New York Foreign 
Exchange Market (average of daily transaction value; %) 
March  April  March  April 
1980  1983  1986  1989 
U.S.  dollar/Japanese yen  10.2  22.0  23.0  25.2 
U.S.  dollar/deutsche mark  31.7  32.5  34.2  32.9 
U.S. dollar/pound sterling  22.8  16.6  18.6  14.6 
U.S.  dollar/Swiss franc  10.1  12.2  9.7  11.8 
Cross transactions  -  0.2  -  3.6 
Totala  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
(billion $ U.S.)  (  18.0)  (26.0)  (58.5)  (  128.9) 
Sources: BIS, “Survey of Foreign Exchange Market Activity” (Bask, various issues); and other 
sources. 
“otal  includes transactions involving currencies other than those listed above and so is not the 
sum of numbers above. 
notes overseas would be less than 1 percent of total notes outstanding. This is 
in sharp contrast with U.S. dollar notes, which are widely used as a “parallel 
currency” in many developing countries and recently in Eastern Europe: ac- 
cording to some unpublished sources, a variety of evidence suggests that more 
than half of all U.S. currency outstanding is held abroad. 
13.3  Background to the Increase in the International Use of Yen 
To  summarize developments reviewed  in  the  previous  section:  the  yen 
emerged as an international currency in 1970, a trend which grew rapidly in 
the mid-1980s. This growth owed much to the greater international presence 
of the Japanese economy and also partly to the revision of  the Foreign Ex- 
change and Foreign Trade Control Law in 1980, which saw a major change in 
principle, from “prohibited if not explicitly allowed” to “allowed if not explic- 
itly prohibited.” Growth has decelerated considerably since the late  1980% 
principally because potential demand for yen  had already been satisfied to a 
large extent. 
However, it is premature to draw the conclusion that the international use of 
yen is likely to grow only pari passu with the growth of the Japanese economy. 
For a currency to become widely used as an international currency, there must 
be (see, e.g., Tavlas and Ozeki 1992; Black 1990): (i) confidence that its value 
will be stable, which means not only low inflation with little fluctuation but 
also political stability in the home country, and (ii) the existence of stable fi- 
nancial markets in the home country where a wide range of  instruments are 
traded freely in considerable volume. 
13.3.1  Inflation 
Table  13.10 compares both the level and fluctuation of inflation in selected 
industrial countries and Asian economies. Together with Germany, Japan has Table 13.9  Currency Composition of Transactions on Major Foreign Exchange Markets (billion $ U.S.) 
U.S.  Deutsche  Japanese  Pound 
Market  Dollar  mark  Yen  Sterling  ECU  Other  Total 
United Kingdom  216(90)  70  (29)  42  (17)  74  (31)  4.0(1.7)  77(32)  241 (200) 
United States  167 (96)  58  (33)  48  (28)  25  (14)  0.5  (0.3)  49 (28)  174 (200) 
Japan  138(95)  14  (10)  116  (80)  5.4  (4)  -  17 (12)  145 (200) 
Singapore  60(95)  18  (29)  18  (29)  11  (17)  -  20 (32)  63 (200) 
Hong Kong  56(93)  12  (20)  15  (25)  7.7 (13)  0.1 (0.2)  29 (48)  60 (200) 
Australia  36 (97)  5.6 (15)  3.7 (10)  3.1  (8)  -  26 (70)  37 (200) 
Totalofmajor  838(90)  247  (27)  253  (27)  138  (15)  8  (1)  382(41)  932(200) 
21 markets 
Source: BIS, “Survey of Foreign Exchange Market Activity” (Bale, February 1990). 
Notes:  Daily average in April 1989. Number in parentheses is currency’s share as a percentage of total transactions. 344  Hiroo Taguchi 
Table 13.10  Inflation Rate in Selected Countries (%) 
Average  Standard Deviation 

















































































Source: IMF, “International Financial Statistics” (Washington, D.C.). 
recorded the best performance in terms of both measures in the last decade, 
although the difference among countries has been narrowing in recent years. 
13.3.2  Political Stability 
Price stability alone is not sufficient to assure confidence in a currency: po- 
litical instability in an issuing country may undermine confidence in its cur- 
rency even if inflation is not a problem. This is a major reason that the U.S. 
dollar has maintained its role as the dominant international currency. It could 
be argued that in light of  recent regime changes in Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union, the importance of this “safe haven” function of the U.S. 
dollar is diminishing in favor of the yen. However, in Asia, geopolitical insta- 
bility still persists, most notably in the form of North Korea and Indochina. In 
addition, trade and social friction between Japan and the United States may 
also work against the wider use of the yen worldwide and in Asia in particular. 
13.3.3  Current Account Surplus 
At least in the early phase of “internationalization,”  a (large) current account 
surplus is considered important. Indeed, it cannot be denied that the fact that 
Japan has consistently recorded a large current account surplus since the early 
1980s has been conducive to wider use of the yen outside Japan. For one thing, 
Japanese financial institutions were in an advantageous position in recycling 
that surplus to deficit countries. Perhaps more important, this large accumu- 345  On the Internationalization of the Japanese Yen 
Table 13.11  Size of Short-term Money Markets in Japan, the United States, and 
Germany (billion $ U.S.) 
1981 (year-end)  1985  1990 
Japan  84.8  (7.3)  182.3 (13.5)  676.2 (22.8) 
United States  964.3 (31.6)  1260.6 (31.4)  1760.8 (32.2) 
Germany  101.8 (14.9)  128.8 (20.7)  497.9 (33.2) 
Source: Bank of Japan, Comparative Economic and Financial Statistics-Japan  and Other Major 
Countries (Tokyo, various issues). 
Note: Figures in parentheses are ratio to GNP. 
lated surplus, which exceeded $530 billion during 1980-9 1, has certainly 
helped foster the credibility of Japan’s financial institutions, markets, and cur- 
rency. 
13.3.4  Financial Markets 
The size of  Japan’s money markets grew considerably in the 1980s (table 
13.11)  and, talung into account the recent progress of interest rate deregulation, 
as well as the size of  capital markets, it is fair to say that the condition of 
having “wide, deep, and free financial markets” is already met to a large extent. 
However, it is also true that there is still significant room for improvement in 
many respects, inter alia, with regard to the transparency of  financial institu- 
tions and their transactions, freedom concerning the placement of new instru- 
ments, and taxation on financial and capital transactions. 
13.4  The Potential Role of the Yen as a “Nominal Anchor” for Asia 
In sum, the conditions necessary for the yen to assume a greater role than it 
currently plays are already broadly met, even if  there is some room for im- 
provement. What role, then, should the yen play? This section discusses the 
possibility of a “yen bloc” in Asia. 
A brief look at  trade figures shows that intraregional trade among major 
economies in  Asia and Oceania2 (hereafter referred to as Asia) is growing 
steadily, accounting for about 40 percent of the total trade of the economies in 
the region (table 13.12). However, it should also be noted that trade with the 
United States accounts for about 20 percent. The fact that the United States is 
still by  far the single most important trading partner for Asian economies no 
doubt explains why the U.S. dollar plays an important role in the region. 
Japan’s direct investments in the region grew considerably in the second half 
of the 1980s (table 13.13). It is true that as a proportion of total investments, 
they are still not very  large; in fact, the proportion was much larger in the 
2. Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, 
Australia, New Zealand, and China. 346  Hiroo Taguchi 
Table 13.12  Country Composition of nade  in Asian Countries (%) 
1975  1980  1985  1990 
United States  19.58  19.28  25.12 
Asia (A)  33.35  34.69  36.37 
(39.16) 
Japan  11.03  10.73  10.32 
Ratio of trade in Asian  12.33  14.26  17.06 
countries to world  (19.17) 
trade (B) 










Sources: IMF, Direction of Trade (Washington, D.C.,  various issues); other sources. 
Nofes: Trade with Taiwan is included only in figures in parentheses. 
Annual growth rates of  world trade were 18.5, -0.6,  and 12.9 percent for the periods  1975-80, 
1980-85,  and  1985-90,  respectively. Annual growth rates of  Asian trade (excluding trade with 
Taiwan) were 22.0 and 3.9 percent for the first two periods and (including trade with Taiwan) was 
14.7  percent for the last period. 
Table 13.13  Japan's Outward Direct Investment by Country 
Total from 
1975  1980  1985  1990  1951 
Total (billion $ U.S.) 
Country share ('70) 
United States 
Europe 
Southeast Asiaa (A) 
China (B) 
Australia (C) 
New Zealand (D) 
A+B+C+D 
32.8  46.9 
26.8  31.6 
10.2  12.3 
32.8  24.8 
0.0  0.3 
4.8  9.3 
0.1  0.2 
31.7  34.7 
122.2  569.1 
44.2  45.9 
15.8  25.1 
10.8  11.6 
0.8  0.6 
3.8  6.5 
0.2  0.4 









Source: Ministry of  Finance (Tokyo). 
Note: Years are fiscal years. 
.'Includes  Korea,  Hong  Kong,  Taiwan,  Singapore,  Malaysia,  the  Philippines,  Indonesia,  and 
Thailand. 
1970s. However, while investments in the 1970s were concentrated in a few 
countries like Indonesia and the Philippines, they are now much more wide- 
spread geographically. 
Another fact that stands out is the recent growth in direct investment be- 
tween the so-called newly industrialized  economies (NIEs) and Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. Tables 13.14 and 13.15 give a 
breakdown of direct investments in Indonesia and Thailand by investor coun- 
try. In the case of Thailand, Japan is the largest investor, accounting for 37.2 
percent of total investments in the 1970-89  period, followed by Hong Kong, 347  On the Internationalization of the Japanese Yen 
Singapore, and Taiwan together at 22.7 percent (which exceeds the U.S.  figure 
of  20.7 percent). The importance of  the NIEs as investors is becoming even 
more pronounced. In Indonesia, NIEs account for more than half of nonpetrol 
direct investment projects. 
Such trade and investment data suggest that economic interdependence is 
growing rapidly among Asian economies. However, since growth in intraregio- 
nal trade and investments is partly a reflection of  the higher growth of  the 
region compared to that of the rest of the world, one cannot go so far as to say 
that Asia is on the way  to forming an economic bloc. As shown in Frankel 
(1992), the intraregional trade bias index (defined as the share of intraregional 
trade in the total trade of  a region divided by the share of trade of that region 
Table 13.14  Direct Investment in Nonpetrol Projects to Indonesia 
Total 
1986  1987  1988  1989  1986-89 
Total (million $ U.S.) 
































































Source: Pangestu (1991). 
Table 13.15  Direct Investment to Thailand by Country (cumulative investment 
since 1970) 
1974  1981  1986  1989 
Total amount received (million $ US.) 
Country share (%) 
Japan 
United States 















































Source: Tambunlertchai and Ramstetter (1991). 348  Hiroo Taguchi 
in world trade) declined for Asia from 2.2 in  1980 to 1.9 in 1989, in contrast 
to a rise in EC countries from 1.3 to 1.5. Even taking into account that Frankel’s 
estimate does not include Taiwan and that trade figures in Asia for 1989 were 
negatively influenced by the Tienanmen Square incident, this estimate persua- 
sively suggests that Asian countries are not moving toward a “Fortress Asia”- 
type bloc. 
These trends seem to suggest that the yen is not likely to replace (at least 
not in the foreseeable future) the U.S. dollar as the key currency, even in Asia, 
with respect to the three traditional functions of money: as a unit of account 
(invoicing currency), as a means of transaction, and as a store of value (interna- 
tional financial asset). 
A more meaningful role for the yen in a potential “yen zone” in Asia would 
be one resembling that of the deutsche mark in Europe. 
The EMS is generally viewed as a de facto deutsche mark bloc. However, 
that does not mean that the deutsche mark is in every respect the most im- 
portant foreign currency for non-German EMS member countries. For exam- 
ple, deutsche marks constitute only about 23.4  percent of the total foreign re- 
serves of EMS countries. Although this is considerable, it is well below the 
57.9 percent held in U.S. dollars. To give another example, 43.8 percent of 
transactions in French foreign exchange markets involve the deutsche mark, 
compared with 71.9 percent involving the U.S. dollar (note that the currency 
breakdown total adds up to 200 percent). Similar trends are observed in other 
EMS countries. 
The reason that the EMS countries are nevertheless considered a deutsche 
mark bloc is that the deutsche mark is playing the important role of “nominal 
anchor” in maintaining price stability in EMS member countries. 
A currency may  serve as a nominal anchor for other countries in various 
ways. In its most rigid form, it is the currency against which exchange rates 
are pegged. This is the role the deutsche mark presently plays within the EMS. 
However, a currency can also serve as an anchor for price stability in a less 
formal way, if other countries attempt to keep their respective inflation rates in 
line with that of the nominal anchor country, or if  monetary authorities, in 
conducting monetary policy, pay due attention to developments in that country. 
It is this kind of  mild nominal anchor role that the yen might play in the 
future. However, before examining that possibility in detail, we  should first 
briefly review foreign exchange arrangements in Asian and Pacific region 
countries. 
While Hong Kong links its currency to the U.S. dollar and Australia and 
New Zealand let their currencies float, other Asian countries officially link 
their currencies to a basket which includes, inter alia, the U.S. dollar and Japa- 
nese yen.  However,  the composition of  these baskets is  not  officially an- 
nounced and, in practice, they could be considered de facto “managed float- 
ing,” with the main focus on the exchange rate against the U.S. dollar. 
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vis-8-vis the U.S. dollar, measured in terms of variation coefficients, tend to be 
smaller than in those against the yen (table 13.16). However, these fluctuations 
tended to be generally smaller in the second half of the 1980s than in the first. 
Moreover, in the case of the Korean won, volatility vis-8-vis the yen  was in 
fact slightly smaller than vis-8-vis the U.S. dollar, and in the case of the Singa- 
pore dollar, the difference was only very marginal. 
In fact, it seems that in forming their monetary and foreign exchange policy, 
Asian authorities are becoming increasingly more sensitive to developments in 
Japan. This seems to be quite natural since these economies are competing 
more and more with Japan in world export markets and therefore have an inter- 
est in keeping their inflation rate in line with Japan’s. 
In the previous sections and the first part of this section, we reviewed the 
linkage between Japan and Asian countries in terms of the scale of  trade, direct 
investment, and financial transactions. In considering the potential role of the 
yen as a nominal anchor currency as explained above, however, it is not suffi- 
cient to look at these quantitative variables. In fact, the relationship between 
Asian countries and Japan from the viewpoint of linkage of prices, e.g., interest 
rates and the prices of goods, is perhaps more relevant. To obtain a broad view 
of this context, the correlation coefficients of movements in several key vari- 
ables in Asian countries and those in Japan were estimated and compared with 
coefficients between the former and those of the United States. 
There are several reasons for not employing more sophisticated methods. 
For one, there are differences in the quality of data among countries. Moreover, 
in light of the difference in the depth and structure of financial markets, some 
reservations are in order about the international comparability of data. In addi- 
Table 13.16  Coefficient of Variation of Selected Exchange Rates vis-a-vis U.S. 
Dollar and Japanese Yen (coefficient variable to dollar and yen rate)” 
1980-85  1986-9 1 









































Nore: Countries in Asia and Oceania use the following exchange rate systems:  Korea, market 
average rate (allows certain amount of fluctuation centering on market average rate the previous 
day); Australia, New Zealand,  and Taiwan, floating exchange rate; Hong Kong, dollar-pegged 
(HK$7.8 =  $1 U.S.); Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, currency basket (basket not publicized); 
Indonesia and the Philippines, managed floating exchange rate. 
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tion, since the definition of  “nominal anchor” is, by  nature, rather vague, it 
might be too much to investigate causal relationships in different countries. 
Table 13.17 shows the correlation coefficients of movements in Asian short- 
term interest rates with those of Japan and the United States. The coefficients 
were low in the case of Japanese versus Asian interest rates; in fact, negative 
coefficients were obtained in many cases. 
However, these low coefficients might not be sufficient  justification to come 
to any decision. Using a simple interest rate function and concentrating on 
more recent data, Frankel (1992) obtained results suggesting that the influence 
of Japan’s short-term interest rates (relative to interest rates of the United States 
and Germany) on rates in Hong Kong and Singapore was rising (table 13.18). 
Moreover, if two countries are influenced by  different real shocks, efforts by 
either to bring its inflation rate in line with the other’s may widen, rather than 
narrow,  the difference between nominal interest rate movements in the two 
countries. From a theoretical point of view, it would also be interesting to ex- 
amine the relationship among long-term interest rates, especially real interest 
rates. However, the lack of free and deep trading markets for long-term instru- 
ments in most Asian countries prevent any meaningful analysis in  this di- 
rection. 
Similar exercises were conducted with regard to prices of goods. There re- 
mains the problem of which price index to choose. Needless to say, the choice 
hinges crucially upon the aim of the analysis. If one wants to focus on relative 
competitiveness  in the world market, analysis based on domestic manufactured 
goods or export goods may be most relevant. On the other hand, to investigate 
the existence and strength of common external shocks, it would be worthwhile 
to look at the comovements of import prices. Or, if one is interested in causal 
relationships, one may  try to relate one country’s import prices to the export 
prices of  another. However, because the focus here is in the potential of  the 
Table 13.17  International Linkage of Short-term Interest Rate Fluctuation 
(correlation coefficient based on changes from the previous month) 
1980-85  1986-91 
United  United 



























-0.076  - 
0.038  0.003 
0.053  -0.054 
0.087  -0.179 
0.583  0.008 
-0.119  -0.031 
0.138  0.198 
0.081  -0.080 
0.013  0.270 
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Table 13.18  Japanese and U.S. Interest Rate Effects in Five Pacific Countries 
New York 
Constant Term  Tokyo Effect  Effect  R*  D- W 
Singapore 





































































0.82  B 
Korea 















1.28  B 
Hong Kong 






.79  0.59 
Source: Frankel (1992). 
Notes: Table reports regressions of local interest rate against: A-Japanese  and US.  interest rates 
(1988-91  monthly data), B-Japanese  and U.S. interest rates adjusted for expectations of  ex- 
change rate changes (reflected in Currency Forecasters’  Digest),  and C-Japanese  and U.S.  inter- 
est rates adjusted for forward discount. 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
*Statistically different from 0 at the 90 percent level. 
**Statistically different from 0 at the 99 percent level. 
yen as a nominal anchor in the conduct of monetary policy, I have decided to 
concentrate on the consumer price index (CPI), which is the most relevant 
variable in discussing the main objective of  monetary policy, that is, overall 
price stability. The results are reported in table 13.19.3 
3.  Although the comovement of CPI inflation would be a useful criterion for assessing the role 
of a currency as a nominal anchor in an informal way, it may not be for assessing the possibility 
of a fixed exchange rate regime. As De Grauwe (1992) argues, it would be difficult to achieve both 
convergence on inflation and fixed exchange rates if  the differential in productivity growth be- 
tween tradables and nontradables varies among countries. 352  Hiroo Taguchi 
Table 13.19  International Linkage of Price Fluctuation (correlation coefficient 
based on changes in year-on-year CPI inflation rate; monthly data) 
1980-85  1986-91 























































aBased on quarterly data. 
It is interesting that, compared to the first half, coefficients tended to be 
higher in the second half of the 1980s; moreover, the comovement of inflation 
in Asian countries and Japan, relative to that in the United States, is more 
pronounced in the latter period. These tendencies are most noticeable between 
Japan on one hand and Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, and Australia on the 
other. 
It is not surprising that the coefficients are not very high, if one considers 
that it is the second derivative of price level which is examined!  Even within 
Japan, the correlation coefficients between changes in inflation rates vary sig- 
nificantly among different cities. The correlation coefficient between Tokyo 
and Naha, Okinawa, is not very much higher than that between Japan and Ma- 
laysia, for in~tance.~ 
Not many will deny that the European economies are much more homoge- 
neous with each other than are Asian economies. However, there was little 
similarity in price movement among European countries in the 1970s, and it 
was not until the second half of the 1980s that the linkage became obvious.6 
Table  13.20 shows the correlation coefficients of  stock price movements. 
Here, the similarity of movement becomes more significant, at least in the sec- 
ond half of the 1980s. The linkage between price movements in Asian stock 
4.  I also calculated correlation coefficients based on the first derivative of CPI, that is, the level 
of inflation. Naturally, the coefficients were higher than those reported in the paper; however, the 
general tendency was much the same. 
5.  During 1980-85,  the NahalIbkyo and NahdSapporo correlation coefficients were 0.409 and 
0.441, respectively. During 1986-91,  these coefficients were 0.377 and 0.717. 
6. The BelgiudGermany correlation coefficients for the periods  1970-75,  1976-80, 198 1-85, 
and 1986-91  were -0.013,  0.213,  0.458,  and 0.691,  respectively. The France/Germany coeffi- 
cients for these periods were 0.029,0.102,0.109,  and 0.573. 353  On the Internationalization of the Japanese Yen 
markets and in Japan’s market is almost as close as that between the former 
and the U.S.  stock market. Although these results should be interpreted with 
caution, not least since the high coefficients are to some extent due to the 1987 
stock market crash, they are nevertheless suggestive of the growing interdepen- 
dence of these markets. 
Finally, to summarize these exercises, and also to focus on more recent peri- 
ods, canonical correlation coefficients were estimated using inflation rates, 
stock prices, short-term interest rates, and, where reliable data was available, 
long-term interest rates for the periods 1980-87  and 1988-91  (table 13.21). It 
is interesting that coefficients in the case of  Asian countries vis-&,is  Japan 
were higher, without exception, for 1988-91  than for 1980-87.  Moreover, in 
many cases, they were higher than, or very close to, coefficients for Asia vis- 
A-vis the United States. Admittedly, the estimation period may be too short to 
make too much out of this result. Nevertheless, it also seems to illustrate that 
the interdependence of Japan and Asian economies has grown remarkably in 
recent years. 
13.5  Tentative Conclusion 
It is not easy to draw any firm implication from the facts and results dis- 
cussed in  the previous sections: they provide  only piecemeal information, 
which is sometimes contradictory. Moreover, analysis is simplistic: for exam- 
ple, a relatively high correlation coefficient may only be a coincidence. 
Nevertheless, to me at any rate, they seem to suggest that the Japanese yen 
has the potential to serve as a nominal anchor for Asian countries, though not 
as formally as the deutsche mark does for Europe now. One may even venture 
to argue that the Japanese yen is already playing such a role, albeit in a very 
Table 13.20  International Linkage of Stock Price Fluctuation (correlation 
coefficient based on year-on-year changes; monthly data) 











States  Japan 
-0.202  0.093 
0.146  0.135 
0.281  0.383 
0.25  1  0.217 
0.344  0.412 
0.078  -0.016 
0.043  0.162 
0.614  0.393 
0.026  0.147 
United 
States  Japan 
0.316  0.381 
0.253  0.259 
0.445  0.211 
0.560  0.334 
0.530  0.390 
0.507  0.468 
0.093  0.061 
0.649  0.413 
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Table 13.21  Canonical Correlation Coefficients using Changes in Interest Rates, 
Inflation Rates, and Stock Prices 
Japan  United States 































0.558  0.584 
0.417  0.411 
0.404  0.584 
0.604  0.704 
0.603  0.582 
0.618  0.803 
0.393  0.562 
0.682  0.699 
0.372  0.614 
0.450  0.367 
weak sense, since Asian authorities, in formulating their macroeconomic poli- 
cies, pay attention to Japan’s low inflation record. 
To what extent, and at what pace, the Japanese yen will become an anchor 
currency in Asia hinges on many economic and noneconomic factors: e.g., 
how intraregional trade and investment will develop, the future military pres- 
ence of  the United States in this region, whether political ties among Asian 
countries become closer, and the development of the U.S.  economy. 
The development of  the U.S. economy is particularly important. As dis- 
cussed earlier, the U.S.  dollar is now by far the dominant currency in Asia. As 
long as the U.S. economy remains sound and its inflation rate low, the incentive 
for Asian authorities to pay greater attention to the yen and the Japanese econ- 
omy in forming their monetary policy may not strengthen significantly. How- 
ever, if for some reason the performance of the U.S. economy becomes less 
satisfactory to them, the increase in the importance of the yen may accelerate. 
Finally, a greater role for the yen as a nominal anchor for Asian countries is a 
tendency that should neither be encouraged nor discouraged from the Japanese 
viewpoint. The decision whether to have the yen serve such a function should 
be made by the Asian countries themselves. Japan’s responsibility is to make 
sure its financial and capital markets are more convenient and safe for Asian 
areas, as well as for the rest of  the world. Moreover, it is crucial that Japan 
make every effort to maintain price stability so that Asian countries could use 
the yen as a nominal anchor if they so decided. 
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COInment  Kazuo Ueda 
This paper provides a well-balanced assessment of the current degree of inter- 
nationalization of  the yen  and a quite reasonable speculation about what is 
likely to happen in the near future. Taguchi supports his argument by using 
interesting statistics, some of which I see for the first time. I am afraid I do not 
have much to disagree with. 
Taguchi, quite appropriately, differentiates two types of internationalization 
of a currency: one, playing the role of a key or vehicle currency and,  the other, 
becoming a currency against which other central banks try to peg their curren- 
cies. In  the world today,  the first role is clearly played  by  the dollar. The 
deutsche mark is partly playing the second role. I quite agree with Taguchi that 
Kazuo Ueda is professor of  economics at the University of Tokyo. 356  Hiroo Taguchi 
the two aspects of internationalization can be separate issues and that the yen 
could increasingly play the second role, especially in Asia. 
First, I will argue that the yen is not likely to play the first role in the near 
future, largely because Japanese money and financial markets are not fully 
deregulated. Deregulation of the extent that we see in New York or London is 
certainly a necessary condition for the yen to become a key currency. Thus, we 
do not have a large scale treasury bond (TB) market. Because of this, the Bank 
of Japan is having trouble carrying out its daily operations. There are strange 
taxes-for  example, the transactions tax-which  have had a serious negative 
impact on the repurchase agreement (gensaki)  market for Japanese government 
bonds (JGBs). And there is nontransparent moral suasion and administrative 
guidance (  gyuuseishidu) everywhere. 
Second, I would like to point out a problem with other Asian countries peg- 
ging to the yen. Suppose this happened and the Bank of  Japan successfully 
stabilized Japan’s CPI at 0-2  percent, as it did in the 1980s.  Over the last couple 
of decades Japanese export prices have been falling steadily relative to the CPI. 
Hence, zero percent inflation in the Japanese CPI implies a negative inflation 
rate for Japanese export prices, creating strong deflationary pressure on other 
countries. 
Comment  Anne 0.  Krueger 
At a time when there is discussion of Maastricht in connection with the Euro- 
pean Single Market and of a Western Hemisphere Free Trade Agreement with 
the dollar already the regional currency, it is natural that many are discussing 
the trading and exchange relationships among Asian countries. In this connec- 
tion, Hiroo Taguchi has performed a valuable service in considering the Japa- 
nese yen’s potential as the nominal anchor for the exchange rates of the region. 
I found his analysis insightful and to the point. I also agree with him that 
the factors conducive to the use of  the yen  as an international currency are 
substantially weaker than those affecting the dollar or the deutsche mark. It 
was only in the mid- 1980s that Japan liberalized the regulations governing yen 
transactions on capital account. Until that had happened, it was not conceivable 
that the yen could be an international currency. Even now, although liberaliza- 
tion has proceeded a considerable distance, I suspect that there are still con- 
straints on yen capital account convertibility. The fact that liberalization has 
only been recent and still may  not be complete will limit the yen’s  role for 
some time. 
Because I am so much in accord with the basic thrust of the paper, I shall 
use my time to extend his analysis, rather than to comment directly on it. A 
Anne 0.  Krueger is professor of Economics at Stanford University and a research associate at 
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useful starting point, it seems to me, is the old “optimum currency area” dis- 
cussion pioneered by Mundell(l961). There, Mundell noted that the currency 
of a country producing only a single commodity (such as bananas or tin) would 
be of little use as a store of value, since its purchasing power (assuming domes- 
tic price stability) reflected nothing more than the price of other commodities 
in terms of that single commodity. 
However, when domestic prices are nominally sticky, exchange rate changes 
can serve to bring about the necessary relative price adjustments. To make his 
point, Mundell questioned whether western Canada and the western United 
States might not form an optimum currency area relative to the eastern parts 
of  both countries, since the West  was mineral- and agriculture-rich and the 
East was more manufacturing-intensive. 
Mundell’s analysis  intentionally neglected the  role  of  public policy  in 
smoothing the resource reallocations that terms of trade changes bring about. 
Therefore, a second aspect of  an optimum currency area-the  area within 
which mechanisms are in place through internal transfers to smooth adjust- 
ments that are needed-was  not considered. 
In many regards, this second aspect is dominant when we consider the yen 
as a nominal anchor for Asian countries: as of  1992, inflation rates had not 
converged, and  the  commodity composition of  output and  trade differed 
greatly between Japan and other East Asian countries. By contrast, EC mem- 
bers’ commodity composition of output was, while not identical, sufficiently 
similar so that a movement of the ECU against the dollar was meaningful in 
facilitating a terms of trade change. A simultaneous  movement of the yen, ring- 
git, and  rupiah would  do nothing to  assist in  adjusting to terms of  trade 
changes, be they of petroleum, agricultural commodities,  or other goods. Japan 
imports primary commodities from Southeast Asia and exports manufactures 
to it: if Malaysia, Indonesia, or Thailand used the yen as a nominal anchor, 
those countries would need to achieve a degree of price-level stability similar 
to that of  Japan and simultaneously find other mechanisms for adjusting to 
terms of trade shocks. 
Hence, I conclude that the use of  the yen  as a nominal anchor for Asian 
currencies will probably be weak for the foreseeable future. I do agree that 
price-level stability in Japan increases resistance to inflation in other countries, 
but not sufficiently to bring about convergence in inflation rates. 
At  any event, integration of trade need not mean currency integration, at 
least for the next decade. To the extent that the Southeast and East Asian coun- 
tries continue their rapid growth, convergence in living standards, economic 
structures, and inflation rates may begin to occur. As that happens, there may 
be more scope in the future for an Asian currency area. 
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